

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	
1	DCT	27 Jan	
2	DIO/C/JC		
3	DDI		
4			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
		DATE	
		27 Jan	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO.

Copy #1 See 13

26 Jan 76

X Ray - attached
76-6119

Handle Via
COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
 those approved for the following specific activities:



Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

USAF review(s) completed.

Top Secret

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Security Classification)

E2 IMPDET

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330



26 JAN 1976

Honorable William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

Dear Mr Colby

Reference my comments at the 23 Jan 76 USIB with respect to the forthcoming meeting at [redacted] on secrecy and compartmentation.

25X1

In reiteration, I consider it essential that the [redacted] group include the J-2's of EUCOM and PACOM and a representative of the Joint Staff.

25X1

As currently conceived, the group consists primarily of producers. I believe the consumers must also be represented if you are to obtain the results visualized in your 13 Jan 76 memorandum. This is not to say that the group as currently constituted is insensitive to the needs of the consumer. However, I believe you will agree that consumer needs can be best presented by the consumers themselves. Further, I certainly do not believe that expansion of the group from 4 to 7 members should be a limiting factor.

Also, in view of the relatively short time allotted for the group's deliberations, I would urge that the results and recommendations of two recent detailed studies on compartmentation be used as the base line.

The first such study is the one recently completed and disseminated by a Task Force formed under the aegis of the USIB Security Committee. This report may not have reached you yet, but it does point up some very viable solutions which adequately balance secrecy and compartmentation with more effective utilization. The second is a JCS study dealing solely with the TK compartment. I hope this will be completed and in your hands by the time of the [redacted] meeting.

25X1

CLASSIFIED BY: DOD Directive 5500.17(M-2)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF DISCLOSURE ORDER 11052

EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 2

DECASSITY UPON NOTIFICATION BY THE ORIGINATOR

CONFIDENTIAL

S-32

25X1


SUB II

CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2003/10/01 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002400100001-4

We all look forward, I am sure, to seeing the [redacted] meeting rapidly produce solutions to our long standing problems in the compartmentation area. I earnestly believe that the approach suggested above will facilitate that objective in the most timely and economical way possible.

25X1

Sincerely



GEORGE J. KEEGAN, JR.
Major General, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff, Intelligence

Cy to: DepSecDef Mr Ellsworth
DIRDIA Lt Gen Tighe

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference
ONF

Executive Registry

76-6119

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Secrecy and Compartmentation

1. Over the past several years there have been numerous recommendations and complaints concerning the present security classification systems, and particularly its intelligence compartmentation aspects. Suggestions have been made to alter the compartmentation procedures to allow wider dissemination of information , while at the same time, separate concerns have been expressed about protecting vulnerable aspects of sensitive programs. Despite the diversity of opinions in the community, I believe they are not mutually exclusive. There is an urgent need to get intelligence to the essential users, as well as to protect those secrets whose compromise would jeopardize intelligence effectiveness. The objective of security policy must be to strike a balance between these needs.
2. Although there have been some useful studies on the subject, I believe it is now imperative that these problems be examined in a comprehensive way and that policy guidelines be developed to serve as a basis for designing a simplified classification system which will provide the necessary protection of intelligence sources and methods and will facilitate access to the results of the intelligence process by all consumers who need the intelligence product.
3. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you that I have asked Dr. Edward Proctor to chair a group of senior intelligence officials from NSA, DIA and State to study this problem. This group is to prepare recommendations on an expeditious basis for the DCI which I anticipate will subsequently be submitted to the USIB for consideration.


W. E. Colby

Mr. Evans,

The minutes of the 23 Jan USIB meeting have
not been finalized yet. USIB/S says probably tomorrow.



STATINTL